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1. See <http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/native_title_three/index.htm>.
INTRODUCTION
In this Topical Issue I seek to explore the ramifications of the Native Title Act Reform Bill, 
a private senator’s bill introduced by Senator Rachel Siewert of the Australian Greens. 
The Bill seeks to amend the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) to effect reforms that target 
two key areas for native title claimants: the barriers that registered native title claimants 
experience in making the case for determination of native title rights and interests, 
and procedural issues relating to the complex future act regime. These issues need to 
be addressed in the interests of native title claimants, but also in the wider national 
interest. I concur with the view in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill that, if 
passed into law, it will implement important and arguably long overdue reforms to the 
NTA that will enhance its effectiveness.
Of particular significance here is the attempt to move the NTA in a direction that is 
more consistent with principles enunciated in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was belatedly supported by the Australian 
Government in April 2009. Domestically, changes to the future act regime are likely to 
ensure more equitable and efficient processes for negotiating resource development 
projects on land where there is a registered native title claim or a determination of 
native title.
The issues that this Bill seeks to address have been highlighted for a number of years and 
are complex, indeed so complex and politically contentious that they have been largely 
ignored. So as an academic whose research over the past three decades has focused 
on Indigenous development and policy, I want to commend the Australian Greens for 
developing and tabling this comprehensive reform package in the Australian Parliament. 
NTA:
Native Title 
Act 1993
UNDRIP:
United Nations 
Declaration 
on the Rights 
of Indigenous 
Peoples
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I do not propose to rehearse in any detail the extensive native title literature and arguments within it on 
the two broad issues of native title recognition under Australian law and the operations of the future 
act regime that has afforded asymmetric power favouring resource developers in negotiations. That is 
because there are a number of recently published books that do this very well including Lisa Strelein’s 
Compromised Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases since Mabo (2009), David Ritter’s Contesting Native 
Title: From Controversy to Consensus in the Struggle over Indigenous Land Rights (2009) and The Native 
Title Market (2009) and a volume of essays Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous Australians and Mining 
(2009) that I have co-edited with David Martin. And this is just a selection of recent titles. 
So rather than provide a comprehensive submission heavily referenced as is the usual academic 
approach, I am keen to provide a brief submission written in an accessible essay style. For me personally, 
this submission is the latest in a surprisingly large number made to parliamentary and departmental 
inquiries on native title matters in the last two years. Rather than rehearse my earlier arguments in 
any detail, I will merely provide links here to my three most recent submissions: to the House Standing 
Committee on Economics Inquiry into Indigenous economic development in Queensland and review of 
the Wild Rivers (Environmental Management) Bill 2010 (dated 18 February 2011; and published as CAEPR 
Topical Issue 6/20112); to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee Inquiry into the Wild 
Rivers (Environmental Management) Bill 2010 [No.2] (dated 31 March 2010; and published as CAEPR 
Topical Issue 2/20103); and to the Australian Government’s Indigenous Economic Development Strategy 
Draft for Consultation (dated 17 December 2010; and published as CAEPR Topical Issue 3/20114). I do 
so in part because it is my view that many of the issues to be addressed in this Inquiry, at least in so far 
as they relate to the economic empowerment that native title might bestow on Indigenous Australians, 
are closely linked with issues raised in these earlier Inquiries. I also do so to provide members of the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs a sense of my perspectives on native 
title property rights and associated development implications that will inform the following commentary. 
I draw attention in particular to two of my recommendations. My only recommendation to this 
Committee’s earlier Inquiry into the Wild Rivers Bill was (and I paraphrase) that there is a need to review 
all land rights and native title laws Australia-wide to ensure that important resource rights and free prior 
informed consent rights proposed for Cape York by the Abbott Opposition be given national attention. 
My first recommendation to the House Standing Committee on Economics was that the unprecedented 
form of native title property rights being proposed in the Wild Rivers Bill as a special measure for 
advancement and protection on Cape York be extended to all parts of Australia as proposed by the 
Australian Greens in the Bill that is the subject of this Inquiry. I highlight these submissions to make my 
vested intellectual interest in this Inquiry transparent, while noting that I was referring to a draft of the 
current Bill.
I provide this somewhat reflexive opening commentary because of the conflicted and highly 
politicised nature of Indigenous policy making, including sensible legal reform, in Australia. Under 
such circumstances the need for transparency seems paramount. And now to some scene setting, brief 
commentary on several areas of proposed reforms, a comment on what is missing in the reform agenda 
and a final comment on the politics of reform.
2. Altman, J. ‘Wild rivers and Indigenous economic development In Queensland’, Topical Issue No. 6/2011, CAEPR, ANU, 
Canberra, available at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2011TI6.php>.
3. Altman, J. ‘Wild rivers and informed consent on Cape York’, Topical Issue No. 2/2010, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra, available 
at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2010TI2.php>.
4. Altman, J. ‘The Draft Indigenous Economic Development Strategy: A Critical Response’, Topical Issue No. 3/2011, CAEPR, 
ANU, Canberra, available at <http://caepr.anu.edu.au/Publications/topical/2011TI3.php>.
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Fig. 1. Aboriginal lands, Native Title Determinations, and discrete Indigenous communities, 2010
Fig. 2. The Indigenous Estate and discrete Indigenous communities, 2010
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SCENE SETTING
The NTA was passed in 1993 in response to what some have referred to as the judicial revolution of the 
High Court’s Mabo judgment of 1992 that recognized a form of Indigenous ‘native title’ at common law. 
Some, and I include myself here, viewed this as a ‘judicial revolution’; while others such as David Ritter in 
his recent book Contesting Native Title (2009) have argued that by recognising native title, Australia was 
merely catching up with precedents set in other settler colonial societies, caught up, perhaps, in the tide 
of global history. 
There has been a spectrum of views about the benefits of native title to Indigenous people on two 
inter-linked issues. The first is the extent of land over which there have been successful native title 
determinations. The second is what development benefit native title determinations, even from so-called 
‘exclusive possession’, might have actually generated.
For the Committee’s information I present two maps developed with my colleague John Hughes from 
a variety of sources including the National Native Title Tribunal. Fig. 1 shows the national coverage of 
land vested with Indigenous groups as a result of land rights and native title laws. To summarise briefly, 
an estimated 1.7 million sq kms is now vested in diverse forms of Indigenous ownership or management 
following land claims and over 100 successful native title determinations. Clearly, however, there is 
enormous inequity in their geographic distribution, with over 98 per cent by area being in remote 
Australia. And a successful determination does not equate to ownership; it could mean that the group 
has simply been determined to hold non-exclusive rights to hunt, fish, camp etc. In other words, despite 
apparent massive land and native title coverage, the cliché about Aboriginal people being ‘land-rich but 
dirt poor’ needs to be challenged given the weak property rights under which much of this land is held.
Fig. 2 shows areas where there are registered Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs), although in such 
situations there are generally very weak, if any, procedural rights in relation to future acts. The map also 
shows declared Indigenous Protected Areas of high conservation value.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that the national diversity in land rights and native title laws 
constitute very different forms of property. The cogent argument that is being increasingly put forward 
by Indigenous interests is that for land ownership to have economic development potential land owners 
must enjoy a form of free prior informed consent rights that constitutes a meaningful form of property. 
Such a form of property is only effectively recognised under land rights law in the Northern Territory. 
This issue has been at the heart of the Wild Rivers debate, as well as development disputes in the Pilbara 
and west Kimberley.
In a broader Indigenous policy context it can readily be argued that if the Closing the Gap policy 
framework is to have any realistic prospect for reducing disadvantage for the estimated 100,000 
Indigenous people living at the 1,200 discrete Indigenous communities (as shown on maps) on what I 
term the ‘Indigenous estate’, there will be a need to strengthen their rights to not just own but also to 
use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
ownership as noted in Article 26 (2) of UNDRIP. Or to put it more bluntly, how can socioeconomic gaps 
be closed without economic development where people live? Such development will surely require 
property rights in commercially valuable resources and more balance in possibilities for negotiation 
for equitable compensation deals when commercial activities, especially mineral extraction, occurs on 
Indigenous land. As the Australian government itself seeks to extract a greater share of mineral rent 
from resource developers, with its proposed Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT), so consideration needs 
to be given to how native title groups might similarly gain an equitable share of mineral rents generated 
from their land.
ILUA:
Indigenous Land Use 
Agreement
MRRT:
Mineral Resources 
Rent Tax
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THE NATIVE TITLE ACT AND UNDRIP
The NTA was passed in 1993, 14 years before the adoption of UNDRIP by the General Assembly on 13 
September 2007. 144 states voted in favour of UNDRIP, with Australia being one of only four nations 
who voted against. On 3 April 2009 Australia reversed its position. The NTA Reform Bill aspires to 
more closely align Australia’s native title law with UNDRIP principles that themselves seek to embody 
recognition and implementation of international human rights. As a General Assembly Declaration 
UNDRIP is not a legally binding instrument under international law, but clearly in now supporting 
UNDRIP the Australian government is keen to see its principles reflected in Australian domestic law 
dealing with Indigenous Australians. 
Importantly, in the Wild Rivers (Environmental Management) Bill 2010 proposed by the Leader of the 
Opposition Tony Abbott direct use was made of Articles in UNDRIP that refer to the right of Indigenous 
peoples to own, use, develop and control their lands while also guaranteeing that Indigenous land owners 
have a right of consent over any decision that might affect their lands. This reference by the Opposition 
Leader to UNDRIP is surprising given the Howard government’s strong opposition to the Declaration. 
In my view it is quite appropriate for the NTA to be updated to comply as closely as possible to key 
‘property and procedural rights’ principles in UNDRIP. I note additionally that Indigenous groups are 
invoking articles in UNDRIP to highlight their relative disadvantage in benefitting economically from 
their lands and in having more equitable leverage for negotiating with powerful economic actors over 
development where native title interests have been recognised.
THE DEFINITION OF ‘TRADITIONAL’ AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Ever since the NTA was passed there has been criticism of the courts’ interpretation of S223 which has 
been very narrow and uninformed by the body of international common law on native title. Arguably, 
the problem is not so much the requirement that claimants must legally demonstrate continuity of 
rights and interests under ‘traditional laws acknowledged’ and ‘traditional customs observed’ or in the 
need to demonstrate the maintenance of connection with lands and waters since colonisation. Rather, 
the problem stems from the Federal and High Courts’ interpretations of these requirements resulting in 
Indigenous Australians have become trapped in a western legal definition of authenticity to gain formal 
title to their ancestral lands. The onus has been on them to prove their authenticity. 
The operations of S223 have obviously worked for some native title claimants as clear from the maps 
above. And in other cases native title claimants have missed out perhaps most clearly in the Yorta 
Yorta case. Some commentators have been highly critical of the processes for claiming land under 
native title law, referred to by historian Patrick Wolfe as ‘repressive authenticity’ and by anthropologist 
Elizabeth Povinelli as the ‘cunning of recognition’ because the late modern Australian liberal democracy 
is permitting return of land, but only if claimants can legally prove forms of ‘original’ connections and 
continuity of custom as required by western laws, as if never invaded. 
The NTA Reform Bill looks to deal with this issue in two ways. First, it is proposed that the burden of 
proof be shifted so that in determining native title it will be assumed that registered claimants enjoy 
continuity of custom and connection unless government parties can prove otherwise. Second, it is 
proposed that the notion of ‘traditional’ is not frozen at some fictitious time of colonial contact but is 
recognized as both evolving and adaptive as all cultures are. This appears to have been the intention 
of the High Court in the Mabo judgment but this intent was lost in the codification in the NTA and 
subsequent legal interpretation of the law by differently constituted High Courts. 
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Such changes will allow the recognition that contemporary Aboriginal social norms, even in the remotest 
parts of Australia, comprise a mix of customary and western social norms and values to various degrees. In 
recent years, cultural analysis in Australia has increasingly rejected the false essentialised distinction between 
modernity and tradition. Instead there is a recognition of the intercultural circumstances of Indigenous life 
everywhere, with the precise nature of this interculturality varying enormously across the continent.
Having said this, it is important to note that these changes will reduce the legal burden of proof that 
claimants have to demonstrate to a generally non-Indigenous wider jural public and the state. But 
there will still be a need for detailed and complex connection research both for passing the registration 
test to lodge a claim and to ensure that the correct native title interests are identified within regional 
Indigenous domains.
The proposed changes to the NTA here will not entirely undo the ‘repressive authenticity’ embedded in 
Australian law, but it will go some way to ameliorating its impact.
THE FUTURE ACTS REGIME AND GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS
From the time that the NTA was passed it was recognized that its ‘future acts regime’ conferred a 
weaker form of property on native title groups than those enjoyed by traditional owners of land in the 
Northern Territory under Commonwealth land rights law passed in 1976. This is because at best, native 
title groups only had a right to negotiate with resource developers, not a right to exclude them. In the 
Northern Territory on the other hand, in part because of historical precedent limiting access on pre-land 
rights Aboriginal reserves, land owners have rights that amount to free prior informed consent rights, 
sometimes called a right of veto. While this is not a de jure property right in minerals, it is a de facto 
right created by the right to exclude. The only reason for this weaker property right in the NTA was 
political: at the time the NTA was being debated and was eventually passed a judgment was made that 
such an approach was needed to expedite passage through the Australian Parliament. At that time it 
was also unclear if native title rights might include mineral rights that were retained by the Crown (the 
Australian government) on land granted under the Northern Territory Land Rights Act.
So, an innovative and somewhat experimental mechanism was introduced in the NTA’s future acts regime 
that encouraged resource developers and native title groups (including registered claimants) to come to 
an agreement within six months without any restrictions on the financial provisions in such ‘commercial’ 
agreements. However, if agreement is not reached during this narrow window of opportunity, then under 
S38(2) of the NTA the matter is referred to an arbitral body [the National Native Title Tribunal] but the 
value of minerals cannot be taken into consideration in determining compensation. 
This regime was introduced in response to mining company views that delay represented a ‘transaction 
cost’ that could undermine the commercial viability of mines and result in a flight of shareholder capital. 
It was intended that an incentive structure would be created to encourage all parties to settle in good 
faith and out of court. The message to miners was to expedite proceedings by making reasonable, even 
generous, compensation offers. The message to native title groups was not to use the rights to negotiate 
as a de facto right of veto because in all likelihood less compensation would be provided from an 
arbitrated, rather than negotiated, agreement. At the time I was skeptical that such a blanket approach 
would necessarily work owing to site by site differences in the need for rapid mineral extraction, the 
type of mine and the size and affluence of the mining company.
Over time it has emerged, mainly through the research of Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Tony Corbett and 
David Ritter, which have found that in almost all cases when agreement could not be reached, the 
decision of the arbitral body favoured miners. So a moral hazard has arisen whereby there is actually an 
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incentive for mining companies not to negotiate in good faith and to delay proceedings because they 
will benefit from an arbitrated, rather than negotiated, agreement in situations where a speedy outcome 
is not required. This has meant that the power asymmetry already embedded in the original future acts 
regime has been exacerbated. In particular, native title groups might be forced to settle for inferior 
benefit sharing deals fearing that delay beyond six months might further erode whatever deal is on the 
table. Unfortunately, the meaning of ‘good faith’ has been interpreted very generously by the National 
Native Title Tribunal and the Federal Court, in part because it is very difficult to establish that a company 
has not negotiated in good faith (see Sarah Burnside’s ‘Negotiating in Good Faith under the Native Title 
Act: A Critical Analysis’, 2009.)
The historic genesis of the problem is that the NTA (like the Aboriginal Land Rights Act before it) has 
never been clear whether the negotiated agreements between resource developers and native title 
groups are compensatory for loss of native title rights, in which case it is unclear why the value of the 
mine is an issue; or whether benefit sharing is intended as a fair division of mineral rent with native title 
groups who have a legally recognized interest in the land, but no legal rights in sub-surface minerals. 
If mineral rent is recognized as a legitimate basis for calculating compensation, why does this rationale 
suddenly end after six months? Excluding the value of minerals from the equation after six months 
merely acts to further weaken an already weak property right represented by the right to negotiate. 
It is unquestionable, in my view, that if the arbitral body was legally empowered to recommend profit 
linked, royalty type, payments to native title groups in arbitration and operated in an impartial way, the 
negotiation playing field would be more level; and there would be an incentive for all parties to engage 
in negotiations in ‘better’ faith.
COMMERCIAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
There are two puzzling aspects of the Native Title Act in relation to commercial rights and interests. 
The first is that while customary (non commercial) rights are recognized under S211 of the NTA, 
commercial rights in resources appear excluded. This might make sense if one were to interpret native 
title as frozen in some imagined ‘at the threshold of colonisation’ (to use the term coined by Ian Keen 
in his book Aboriginal Economy and Society, 2004) and so commercial rights, especially to subsurface 
minerals, are viewed as too modern to encompass tradition.
The second is the view that property rights can be neatly divided between customary and commercial. 
This is clearly not the case, as I have demonstrated in research in relation to fresh water property 
rights. If there are competing customary and commercial interests in fresh water (surface or ground) 
it is obviously the case that, not only is the competition over the same water, but that customary use 
might impact on commercial use and vice versa. In the interests of clarifying property rights to reduce 
potential for legal disputation (and associated transaction costs that might arise from litigation) over 
which rights take primacy it is probably sensible not to make imagined distinctions based on the nature 
of use over the same resource.
Legal scholar Lisa Strelein in her book Compromised Jurisprudence: Native Title Cases Since Mabo (2009) 
refers to a series of native title test cases since the Mabo judgment as ‘compromised jurisprudence’. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in High Court decisions to support the customary right of a native title 
party in Yanner v Eaton (1999) but to dismiss the mineral rights of a native title claimant group in 
Western Australia v Ward (2002). Just as in the case of water above, what if the sub-surface mineral 
right is actually a surface mineral right as is the case in much strip mining for iron ore in the Pilbara. 
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Can the land surface that constitutes native title and the mineral that is extracted from that surface 
be neatly demarcated and merely be the subject of a negotiation process whereby native title parties 
cannot say no?
In similar vein, the NTA makes a neat distinction between terrestrial and marine estates in relation to 
the operations of the right to negotiate framework as if such a distinction is logical either on ecological 
or cosmological grounds. Indigenous people who live in the coastal zone has always asserted that their 
terrestrial and marine interests are interlinked and so it makes sense to extend the right to negotiate 
offshore in situations where there has been an offshore native title registered claim or determination. 
Some of the issues that have arisen in relation to the intertidal zone in the Blue Mud Bay High Court 
decision (2008) are instructive here.
Lisa Strelein notes in her book (p. 63) that ‘The assertion by the Crown of property in minerals was 
always going to be a problematic fiction for the courts and it has to be seen as a political compromise’. I 
concur with this view and now wonder how, in accord with Article 26 (2) of UNDRIP native title groups 
can now be granted commercial rights and interests. While sub-surface mineral rights might still require 
‘political compromise’, there are many other old and new forms of property including forestry, fisheries, 
fresh water and carbon, to name four, that could be vested with native title groups to ensure that the 
land is a potential economic asset. I intentionally underline the term potential here to emphasise that 
native title is first and foremost a property right and it is the prerogative of native title groups alone, not 
well-intentioned politicians or resource developers, to decide to what purpose this property right might 
be exercised.
OTHER ISSUES
There are three other issues not addressed in NTA Reform Bill that I would like to briefly raise.
First, as noted already, the precise nature of payments made to native title groups for future acts 
impairment of native title has never been clearly defined. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that, 
at least in part if not in whole, payments to native title parties in relation to a future act on land where 
there is a registered claim or a native title determination are compensatory payments from a private 
source (a mining company) to groups with interest in the land to be mined. This is a very different 
arrangement from that current in the Northern Territory where payments to Aboriginal interests from 
mining on Aboriginal owned land are mainly provided from the equivalents of statutory royalties paid by 
the Commonwealth. In the former case payments are definitely private, in the latter there is some debate 
about their status but the payments are technically at least public. 
And yet over the last three years we have seen considerable attention paid by first the Rudd and now 
Gillard governments to how native title payments should be both taxed and regulated by the state. 
And so there have been three discussion papers released by the Australian government [‘Optimizing 
Benefits from Native Title Agreement’ by the Department of Families, Housing. Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs in February 2009; ‘Native Title, Indigenous Economic Development and Tax’ by 
Treasury in July 2010; ‘Leading Practice Agreements: Maximizing Outcomes from Native Title Benefits’ 
by Attorney-General’s in July 2010] that have all advocated for these compensation payments to be 
used for community purposes. Indeed, mining companies and the Australian government seem to be on 
a concerted campaign to ensure that such payments should be closely regulated in a manner that would 
not be countenanced if made to non-indigenous land owners. 
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I have made submission on each of these discussion papers that this focus is a misallocation of reform 
zeal, while also pointing out that the state is conflicted here as using compensation payments for 
general public and/or community purpose could result in cost shifting away from expenditure areas 
that are the legitimate responsibilities of the state. This reform process appears to have stalled, possibly 
because the paternalistic tone of the discussions papers that reinforces the view of governments and 
mining companies that they have a legitimate role to play in dictating how compensation payments are 
utilized and what form compensation might take, has been challenged. In my view there is no legitimate 
role for either a mining company or the state in regulating the use to which moneys provided in benefit 
sharing agreements are applied.
Second, in so far as at least some share of payments made to native title groups in benefit sharing 
agreements are linked to profit sharing and royalties, there is clearly a political economy struggle over 
the division of the total mineral rent extracted from native title lands between four sets of actors: the 
Australian government; States and Territories; mining companies; and native title groups. There is a 
steep gradient in power from the Australian government and States and Territories that issue licences 
to operate, export licences and have taxation powers being most powerful and native title groups who 
have a mere right to negotiate (despite having ‘exclusive possession’ rights over much land) being least 
powerful and having least leverage. Again in my view the state is conflicted operating in a manner that 
Peruvian lawyer and anthropologist Patricia Urteaga-Crovetto has termed the ‘broker state’. 
The potential for conflict here has grown since the Australian government has proposed its new Mineral 
Resources Rent Tax regime because now both state and mining company actors will be competing more 
directly over the division of mineral rent and there is the prospect that native title groups will miss 
out (an argument made opportunistically by some miners who do not want to pay the new tax). This 
situation can be contrasted again with arrangements in the Northern Territory where Aboriginal interests 
and the Northern Territory government are far less conflicted because both want to see the 20 per cent 
profits tax payable under the NT Mineral Royalty Act levied, cognisant that the Australian government 
will pay equivalents to the Aboriginals Benefit Account. Furthermore, in the Northern Territory, there 
is provision for additional negotiated payments to be made above the statutory royalty equivalent 
minimum that operates as a base. However, it should be noted that only 30 per cent of payments made 
in relation to any mine are paid to Aboriginal corporations whose members live in, or are the traditional 
Aboriginal owners of, the area affected by those mining operations.
Arguably, if the Australian government wants a say in how mining moneys are spent it should share or 
hypothecate a proportion of the mineral rent it levies on resource developers with native title groups, as 
in the Northern Territory.
Third, in recent months considerable popular and social media coverage has been aired on the future 
acts negotiation dispute between Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) and the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal 
Corporation (YAC) in relation to the multibillion dollar Solomon Hub iron ore development in the Pilbara. 
This has been shown to be a highly divisive dispute in large measure because the YAC has been offered 
a relatively poor deal by Pilbara industry standards in terms of financial benefits. Furthermore FMG 
have demonstrated an extremely paternalistic attitude in seeking to regulate native title compensation 
payments. Such an approach should not be possible in 21st century Australia.
When the NTA was passed in 1993 there was an Australian government reluctance to introduce a 
statutory land council system as operating quite effectively in the Northern Territory. This reluctance 
reflected a Keating government acquiescence to concerns expressed by the States that a statutory 
system would give native title interests too much political power. It seems to me that there may be a 
need to revisit this issue to consider the benefits of a statutory role for well resourced and independent 
‘land councils’ (Native Title Representative Bodies or NTRBs) in assisting native title groups negotiate 
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with powerful mining companies and act as ‘at-arms-length’ advocates for native title groups with a 
statutory role as co-signatories of agreements. As in the Northern Territory, consideration could be given 
to providing NTRBs with a revenue stream from royalties that are at least partially independent of annual 
government appropriations.
THE POLITICS OF REFORM
Many of the issues being addressed in the NTA Reform Bill have been around for over a decade and 
yet have remained unresolved. There seems to be an emergent trend in Australian policy making at the 
national level for reform either to be extraordinarily protracted or else be perennially delayed.
Part of the problem in this particular case might be that despite policy rhetoric of practical 
reconciliation or Closing the Gap, elected governments are too conflicted to initiate truly beneficial 
reform for Indigenous Australians. In this submission I have suggested that the Australian government 
(of the day) might be too conflicted on one hand keen to maximize its mineral rent revenue flows from 
native title lands; on the other, being keen to minimize its expenditures by cost shifting legitimate 
government expenses on citizenship entitlements onto native title groups and mining companies. In 
general, governments do not want to antagonize the mineral resources sector in such arrangements, 
although clearly the attention to this priority slipped in 2010 with the political dispute over the Resource 
Super Profits Tax.
It seems to me that at long last the NTA Reform Bill addresses some hard issues that have been identified 
as problematic for a long time and that have been neglected. Aspects of this Bill may need some fine 
tuning, but in my view the Bill should attract multi-party and Independent support if Australia as a 
nation is serious about Closing the Gap on native title lands most of which are located, owing to the 
process of colonisation, in remote Australia 
Ultimately, and a little paradoxically, the impetus for reform appears to have been born from 
a combination of the failure to pass the conservative opposition’s Wild Rivers (Environmental 
Management) Bill 2010 [No.2] and the reform initiative and zeal of the Australian Greens who have 
tabled the NTA Reform Bill. Both the Australian Greens and the Liberal National Party Opposition appear 
to agree that principles articulated in UNDRIP should be applied in Australian domestic law, in the name 
of development opportunity for Aboriginal people living on their own land in remote Australia. There 
might be rare opportunity for reform in the current parliament from an unusual political coalition.
AFTERWORD
16 NOVEMBER 2011
On 9 November 2011 the report into the Inquiry into the Native Title Amendment (Reform) Bill 2011 by 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs was tabled in the Senate chamber. 
The Committee recommended that the Senate should not pass the Bill. In a dissenting report Senator 
Rachel Siewert recommended that the Bill, incorporating revised drafting that would remove reference 
to UNDRIP, be passed.
